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DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia and the
Continued Ascendance of Federal
Common Law: Class-Action Waivers
and Mandatory Arbitration Under the
Federal Arbitration Act
Michael J. Yelnosky*

To insiders, the critique of the Supreme Court’s Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)1 jurisprudence is well known. It goes
something like this: when Congress passed the FAA in 1925, it
was intended to be a simple procedural statute requiring federal
courts to enforce arbitration agreements.2 However, in the last
four decades, the Supreme Court has transformed the FAA into a
source of substantive federal arbitration law requiring
enforcement of virtually every arbitration agreement entered into
in the United States.3 And the critics abound.4
* Dean and Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. Thanks to
RWU Law alum Clare Harmon for the push.
1. 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–16 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
2. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme
Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 99, 99 (2006); Jonathan R. Nelson, Judge-Made Law and the
Presumption of Arbitrability: David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft
Ltd., 58 BROOK. L. REV. 279, 328 (1992).
3. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric versus Reality in Arbitration
Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 129, 131–32.
4. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration
Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 729, 730–31 (2012) (citing David S. Schwartz, ClaimSuppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 250 (2012) (“The
Supreme Court is as irretrievably lost in its arbitration jurisprudence as it
has ever been in any line of cases . . . .”)); Linda R. Hirshman, The Second
Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV.
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Now, even outsiders know about the impact of the FAA. Last
fall, The New York Times ran a front-page three-part series5
describing how companies, by inserting arbitration and classaction waiver provisions into consumer and employment contracts,
can circumvent the courts and take away one of the few tools
citizens have to seek remedies for certain illegal or deceitful
business practices.6 One of the articles quotes The Honorable
William G. Young, a federal district court judge appointed by
President Reagan, as saying, “This is among the most profound
shifts in our legal history . . . . [B]usiness has a good chance of
opting out of the legal system altogether and misbehaving without
reproach.”7
Another article emphasized the ubiquity of
arbitration clauses in the United States: “From birth to death, the
use of arbitration has crept into nearly every corner of Americans’
lives, encompassing moments like having a baby, going to school,
getting a job, buying a car, building a house and placing a parent
in a nursing home.”8 Recently, there have been more robust calls
for FAA reform than ever before,9 but the body of FAA law
1305, 1353 (1985) (The FAA “is now definitively established as a substantive
federal law, preemptive and binding on the states, and articulating a federal
policy extending to issues well beyond its literal terms.”).
5. Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, When Scripture Is the
Rule of Law: Companies Can Compel Arbitrations Guided by Religion, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2015, at A1 [hereinafter Corkery & Silver-Greenberg,
Scripture]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, A ‘Privatization of
the Justice System’: In Arbitration, a Bias Toward Business, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
2, 2015, at A1 [hereinafter Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, Privatization];
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking Deck of Justice: Vast Trend Locks Americans Out of Court – Rulings
Greatly Favor Business, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at A1.
6. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 5, at A1.
7. Id.
8. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, Privatization, supra note 5, at B4.
9. For example, in May 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) published for comment proposed rules that would (1) prohibit
providers of certain consumer financial products and services from using a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement to block consumer class actions in court
and (2) require providers that use pre-dispute arbitration agreements to
submit records relating to arbitral proceedings to the Bureau so that it may
determine whether further Bureau action is necessary.
Arbitration
Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32830 (proposed May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1040). When the comment period ended on August 22, 2016, the
CFPB had received 51,799 comments.
Arbitration Agreements,
REGULATIONS.GOV,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-20160020-0001 (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). Moreover, on August 25, 2016, the
Department of Labor issued regulations, pursuant to President Obama’s
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remains largely intact.
The cause of all this fuss is the operative provision of the
FAA, § 2, which provides that:
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . .
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.10
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that: (1) the FAA
creates federal substantive law favoring arbitration,11 and as such
that law applies in both federal and state courts;12 (2) arbitration
agreements are enforceable even where federal statutory claims
are asserted by the plaintiff;13 (3) most state laws that would
render arbitration agreements unenforceable are preempted by
the FAA;14 and (4) a class-action waiver is enforceable even if the
plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim
exceeds any potential recovery.15
Additionally, state law plays an extraordinarily odd role in
FAA jurisprudence. Section 2 directs courts to enforce arbitration
agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.”16 The Supreme Court has read
that provision as a reference to state law, but only state law that
“govern[s] issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that
Executive Order 13673, that require employers with federal contracts in
excess of $1,000,000 to offer arbitration to any employee with a claim arising
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or any tort related to or
arising out of sexual assault or harassment only after such disputes arise.
Arbitration of Contractor Employee Claims, 81 Fed. Reg. 58562, 58644 (Aug.
25, 2016) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 22).
10. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
11. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“Congress declared
a national policy favoring arbitration . . . .”).
12. Id. at 16 (“Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts
to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”).
13. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (“[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”).
14. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
15. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).
16. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
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takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to
arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of
§ 2.”17
As I have explained elsewhere, this regime forces courts to
make fine distinctions between generally applicable state contract
law and state contract law that singles out arbitration provisions
for suspect status.18 One commentator has labeled the distinction
“fundamentally incoherent.”19 And, to further complicate matters,
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, a 2011 case, the Supreme
Court held that California’s generally applicable contract doctrine
of unconscionability could not be applied to render unenforceable a
class-action waiver in an arbitration agreement.20 However, the
Court did so not because unconscionability is a state-law doctrine
that applies uniquely to arbitration, but because the Court found
that class-wide arbitration “interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration.”21
As I have also explained elsewhere, the Court’s reading of § 2
as referring to state law is dicta, and a better reading is that, like
the rest of § 2, it authorizes the federal courts to create federal
common law to govern the enforcement of covered arbitration
agreements.22 The final strand of FAA jurisprudence that is
important to the forthcoming discussion of DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Imburgia23 is the Court’s repeated insistence that the FAA’s
“primary purpose” is to ensure that private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.24 As indicated by
the Court, courts and arbitrators must “give effect to the
contractual rights and expectations of the parties,” and the
parties’ intentions control.25 Pursuant to that mandate, the Court
enforced a choice-of-law provision in an arbitration agreement

17. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
18. See Yelnosky, supra note 4, at 743–44.
19. David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of
Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 559 (2004).
20. 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011).
21. Id. at 344.
22. Yelnosky, supra note 4, at 736–42, 745–58.
23. 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
24. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Legal Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
25. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682
(2010) (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).
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that permitted the arbitrator to award punitive damages26 and a
provision incorporating California’s arbitration procedures.27
Conversely, the Court reversed an arbitration panel’s conclusion
that an arbitration agreement authorized class arbitration
because there was no evidence that was what the contracting
parties intended.28
As is apparent, the Supreme Court has been accepting and
deciding cases involving the FAA with some frequency. Some,
such as American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant in
201329 and Concepcion in 2011,30 had a high profile.31 DIRECTV,
Inc. v. Imburgia was not one of those cases.32 The plaintiffs were
customers of DIRECTV who brought a class action in California
state court claiming that early termination fees charged to them
violated California law.33 In the trial court, DIRECTV moved to
send the matter to arbitration pursuant to the parties’ service
agreement, which provided that “any Claim either [party] asserts

26.
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57–58
(1995).
27. Volt, 489 U.S. at 474–76.
28. Stolt–Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 673.
29. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–12 (2013) (holding that a class-action waiver in
an arbitration agreement was enforceable in an antitrust action even where
the cost for any plaintiff proceeding individually would far exceed any
possible remedy).
30. 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (holding that California’s doctrine of
unconscionability could not be applied to render unenforceable a class-action
waiver in an arbitration agreement).
31.
Binyamin Appelbaum, Justices Support Corporate Arbitration, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2013, at B3 (covering Italian Colors); Adam Liptak, Supreme
Court Allows Contracts that Prohibit Class-Action Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 2011, at B3 (covering Concepcion).
32.
136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). While there was some press coverage of the
Court’s decision, see Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Rules DirecTV Customers
Must Use Arbitration, Not Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2015, at B3,
knowledgeable reporters knew that the contract provision at its heart was
unusual enough to limit its reach. Id. Prior to the argument in the case, one
commentator wrote that the biggest surprise was that the Court had
scheduled the case for argument instead of summarily reversing. Ronald
Mann, Argument Preview: Justices Face Off Again with California Court
Refusing To Enforce Arbitration Agreement, SCOTUS BLOG (Oct. 2, 2015,
11:41 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/10/argument-preview-justicesface-off-again-with-california-court-refusing-to-enforce-arbitrationagreement.
When I was asked by the editors of this Law Review if I wanted to write
something about a case from the Court’s 2015 term, I had complete
confidence that DIRECTV had not already been “claimed.”
33. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 466.
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will be resolved only by binding arbitration.”34 That contract also
had a waiver of class arbitration: “Neither [party] shall be entitled
to join or consolidate claims in arbitration.”35 Finally, the
contract also provided that “if the ‘law of your state’ makes the
waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, then the entire
arbitration provision ‘is unenforceable.’”36
The trial court denied DIRECTV’s request to send the case to
arbitration, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed, finding
that at the time the contract was executed, the class-action waiver
was unconscionable under California law, and the entire
arbitration agreement was therefore unenforceable.37 Although
the U.S. Supreme Court in Concepcion ruled that California’s
unconscionability doctrine was preempted by the FAA, the
California Court of Appeal determined that that decision did not
change the result here because the parties had simply agreed on a
choice of law provision pertaining to California law before the
Concepcion decision.38 It reasoned that the contract provision was
very specifically directed at class-action waivers and any
ambiguity about the meaning of the provision should be construed
against DIRECTV, the drafter.39 The California Supreme Court
declined to review the case, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed.40
Justice Breyer, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Alito and Kagan, began his opinion, somewhat
oddly, by reminding lower court judges (especially state court
judges) that federal law is supreme and that they are bound to
follow Concepcion.41 I say it is odd because he immediately
acknowledged that this “elementary” point of law did not resolve
the issue in the case.42 The issue was not whether Concepcion
controlled; rather, the issue was whether the parties had exercised
their right to choose the law that would govern their agreement.43
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 466-67 (quoting Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d
190, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)).
38. Id. at 467 (quoting Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 198).
39. Id. (quoting Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195).
40. Id. at 467–68.
41. Id. at 468 (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990)).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 468 (“In principle, they might choose to have portions of
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Justice Breyer also acknowledged that the Court was obliged to
defer to the state courts’ interpretation of the contract, so the
question was whether that interpretation was consistent with the
FAA.44
He concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s
interpretation of “the law of your state” to include “invalid
California law” was inconsistent with the FAA because “California
courts would not interpret contracts other than arbitration
contracts the same way.”45 The conclusion was based on the
parties’ failure to provide any examples of a California court
interpreting a “law of your state” provision to include California
laws that had been invalidated.46 That same reasoning supported
the majority’s conclusion that “the law of your state” was not
ambiguous language and therefore would not ordinarily be
interpreted against the interest of the drafter.47 The Court thus
reversed because California’s interpretation of “law of your state”
did not place arbitration contracts on equal footing with all other
contracts.48
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent that Justice Sotomayor
joined.49 She emphasized that both at the time the service
agreement was drafted by DIRECTV and at the time the plaintiffs
commenced their lawsuit, class-action waivers were per se
unconscionable under California law, and there was no reason for
plaintiffs to think the Supreme Court would hold years later in
Concepcion that this body of law was preempted by the FAA.50
their contract governed by the law of Tibet, the law of pre-revolutionary
Russia, or (as is relevant here) the law of California including [the
unconscionability doctrine] and irrespective of that rule’s invalidation in
Concepcion.”).
44. Id. (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Legal Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)).
45. Id. at 469.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 470 (“But . . . were the phrase ‘law of your state’ ambiguous,
surely some court would have construed that term to incorporate state laws
invalidated by, for example, federal labor law, federal pension law, or federal
civil rights law. Yet, we have found no such case.”).
48. Id. at 471 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
49. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote his own dissent
based on his long-held position that the FAA does not apply in state court
proceedings. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Imburgia v. DIRECTV,
Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)).
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Thus, the California Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the “law of
your state” provision did not suggest discrimination against
arbitration.51 Moreover, she explained, a simple class-action
waiver would have sufficed for DIRECTV’s purposes.52
Incorporating instead the “law of your state” provision was
curious, which made the phrase ambiguous.53
Finally,
interpreting the ambiguous phrase against the drafter was
completely appropriate here, she explained, because DIRECTV
was by far the more powerful party in this transaction.54 She
concluded that the majority demeaned the California Court of
Appeal’s application of traditional tools of state contract law.55
So, why did I want to write about this case? The answer, I am
afraid, is somewhat self-serving. I think Imburgia is an example
of the Court coming even closer to adopting, sub silentio, the
approach I argued for some years ago when I suggested that § 2’s
savings clause does not refer to state law, but to federal common
law created by the courts when interpreting and determining the
enforceability of arbitration agreements covered by the FAA.56
It is already the case, notwithstanding the Court’s insistence,
that § 2 refers to state law, and that most of that state law is
preempted by “a federal common law of arbitration contract
interpretation.”57 But in Imburgia, as Justice Ginsburg points
out, the Court, for the first time, “reversed a state-court decision
on the ground that the state court misapplied state contract law
when it determined the meaning of a term in a particular
arbitration agreement.”58 That would be an undeniable expansion
of the Court’s already capacious willingness to displace state law,
51. Id. at 473.
52. Id. at 474.
53. See id. at 474–75 (“DIRECTV chose a different formulation, one
referring to the ‘law of [its customer’s] state.’ I would not translate that term
to be synonymous with ‘federal law.’ If DIRECTV meant to exclude the
application of California legislation, it surely chose a bizarre way to
accomplish that result.”).
54. Id. at 475.
55. Id. at 478.
56. Yelnosky, supra note 4, at 753–54; see also Cunningham, supra note
3, at 150; Stephen K. Huber, Confusion About Class Arbitration, 7 J. TEX.
CONSUMER L. 2, 6 (2003).
57. Huber, supra note 56, at 6.
58. 136. S. Ct. at 473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Court came close, but there it reversed
an arbitration panel’s interpretation of the parties’ contract to authorize class
arbitration. 559 U.S. 662, 672–75 (2010).
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while at the same time paying lip service to its continuing role.59
And Justice Ginsburg is undoubtedly correct that after this
decision, consumers “lack even the benefit of the doubt when
anomalous terms in [adhesion contracts requiring arbitration]
reasonably could be construed to protect their rights.”60 Imre
Szalai has similarly noted that the Court in Imburgia expanded
FAA preemption to include not only state laws but state court
judges’ interpretations of the language of arbitration
agreements.61
The last question I want to anticipate is why I would advocate
for the expansion of federal authority in this area, where such
federal authority (the Supreme Court) has been so willing to leave
consumers, employees, and others with claims against businesses
out in the cold. The short answer is that I am not advocating for
the current content of FAA law. Instead, I am arguing that an
expansive role for federal law in § 2 is more consistent with the
interpretation of the rest of the statute, as well as the likely
understanding of the 1925 Congress; uniform law makes sense in
this area; and there is nothing about federal common law that is
inherently pro-business.62
Indeed, in the most analogous
statutory regime—Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, which authorizes federal common law
regulation of union-employer arbitration in the private sector—the
law is not skewed in favor of employers.63 There is no reason,
other than the current composition of the Court, that what would
emerge from a fully federalized FAA would not be an improvement
on the status quo.64

59. See Yelnosky, supra note 4, at 757–58.
60. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 476 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. Imre Szalai, DIRECTV v. Imburgia Turns Arbitration Law on its
Head, INDISPUTABLY (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.indisputably.org/?p=7902.
62. See Yelnosky, supra note 4, at 748–51.
63. See id. at 748.
64. Id. at 759.

